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INTRODUCTION
Between 2000 and 2010, United States citizens adopted
over 200,000 children from other countries.1 War, poverty, and
disease all contribute to the overwhelming number of orphaned
children worldwide.2 In addition, as the social framework of
America changes, the popularity of international adoption has
grown.3 Unfortunately, with the increasing number of intercountry
adoptions, a black market of baby selling and child trafficking has
emerged.4 In response to the growing concern over corruption and
*

Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Journal of International & Comparative
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION STATISTICS,
http://adoption.State.gov/about_us/statistics.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2011)
(stating that from the years 2000 to 2010, United States citizens adopted 208,896
children from foreign nations). There are two categories of countries involved in
international adoptions: (1) sending countries, which are the children’s countries
of origin; and (2) receiving countries, which are the countries to which the
children are adopted; see also Laura McKinney, International Adoption and the
Hague Convention: Does Implementation of the Convention Protect the Best
Interests of Children?, 6 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 361, 370–71
(2007).
2
See Lindsay K. Carlberg, Note, The Agreement Between the United States and
Vietnam Regarding Cooperation on the Adoption of Children: A More Effective
and Efficient Solution to the Implementation of the Hague Convention on
Intercountry Adoption or Just Another Road to Nowhere Paved with Good
Intentions?, 17 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 119, 120 (2007) (stating that
millions of children worldwide have become homeless and orphaned due to war,
disease and changing governmental regimes); see also Notesong Srisopark
Thompson, Note, Hague is Enough?: A Call For More Protective, Uniform Law
Guiding International Adoptions, 22 WIS. INT’L L.J. 441, 441 (2004).
3
See United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), INNOCENTI DIGEST, at 3
(1999), available at http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/digest4e.pdf
(acknowledging that the United States receives more foreign adoptive children
than any other country worldwide); see also McKinney, supra note 1, at 367
(attributing the changing demographics of Western countries to an increase in
international adoption).
4
See Erica Briscoe, Comment, The Hague Convention on Protection of
Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption: Are Its Benefits
Overshadowed by Its Shortcomings?, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 437, 437
(2009) (explaining that after World War II, a drastic rise in intercountry
adoption led to the creation of an international black market for babies); see also
Gabriela Marguez, Comment, Transnational Adoption: The Creation and Ill
1
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abuse in international adoption systems, the international
community developed the Convention on Protection of Children
and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (“Hague
Convention”) in 1993.5 The Hague Convention was designed to
provide a uniform legal framework for international adoption that
focuses on the best interests of the children.6
While many find the mission of the Hague Convention
admirable,7 it is often criticized for creating unworkable
procedures.8 Many countries that send children to the U.S. for
adoption do not have the resources to ratify the Hague Convention
or to enforce its policies.9 Moreover, there is little incentive for
Effects of an International Black Market Baby Trade, 21 J. JUV. L. 25, 25–26
(2000).
5
See generally Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act of the
17th Session, including the Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134
[hereinafter Hague Convention] (noting that the international community
constructed a legal framework with the Hague Convention to combat the
exploitation of children); see also Briscoe, supra note 4, at 438 (stating that the
adoption of the Hague Convention on May 29, 1993 expanded the general
principles of the United Nation’s Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)).
6
See Carlberg, supra note 2, at 123 (explaining that the Hague Convention
makes children a national priority); see also Gina M. Croft, Note, The Ill Effects
of a United States Ratification of the Hague Convention on Protection of
Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, 33 GA. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 621, 629 (2005).
7
See Karpenko v. Leendertz, 619 F.3d 259, 265–66 (3d Cir. 2010) (asserting
that the Hague Convention, by offering a judicial remedy for removal in child
abduction cases, ensures the well-being of children, and prevents a cycle of
abduction and re-abduction); see also Stephanie Vullo, The Hague Convention
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: Commencing a
Proceeding in New York for the Return of a Child Abducted from a Foreign
Nation, 14 TOURO L. REV. 199, 201–02 (1997) (providing that the Hague
Convention’s goal is to protect children wrongfully removed, and aids courts in
determining where the children should live).
8
See Sara Dillon, The Missing Link: A Social Orphan Protocol to the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1 HUM. RTS. & GLOBALIZATION
L. REV. 39, 47 (2008) (stating that the Convention has yet to resolve the issues
surrounding intercountry adoption); see also Merle H. Weiner, International
Child Abduction and the Escape from Domestic Violence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
593, 599 (2000) (arguing that the Hague Convention is an ineffective remedy for
child abductions).
9
See Caeli Elizabeth Kimball, Note, Barriers to the Successful Implementation
of the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in
Respect of Intercountry Adoption, 33 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 561, 572 (2005)
(explaining that the burdensome costs of complying with the Hague Convention
might deter non-parties from joining); see also Kelly M. Wittner, Comment,
Curbing Child-Trafficking in Intercountry Adoptions: Will International
Treaties and Adoption Moratoriums Accomplish the Job in Cambodia?, 12 PAC.
RIM L & POL’Y J. 595, 625 (2003) (highlighting that many sending countries are
developing countries, and therefore lack the financial ability to implement
Hague Convention provisions effectively).

Fall 2012]

STUCK IN THE PIPELINE

218

countries to sign the Hague Convention because they may face
moratoriums from the U.S. on outgoing adoptions if they are
unable to meet the Hague Convention standards.10 Aside from
prohibiting future adoptions from those countries, moratoriums
also place a hold on adoptions that are already in the pipeline.11
Thus, American families who have adoptions that are approved,
yet incomplete, must wait until the moratorium is lifted before they
can unite with their adopted children.12
This paper will analyze the Hague Convention focusing on
the problems it has created for American adoptive parents and their
internationally-adopted children, known as “pipeline families,”
whose adoptions were approved before the Convention’s stringent
provisions suspended the process. Part I will provide a brief
background on international adoption and explain why the Hague
Convention was enacted. Part II will address the standards of the
Hague Convention as well as its effects on international adoption.
Part III will discuss American families who had or have adoptions
in the pipeline and their struggle to unite with their adopted
children. Last, Part IV will propose solutions to the pipeline
adoption problem. These proposals include providing U.S.
government aid to countries attempting to execute the Hague
Convention standards, entering into bilateral agreements with those
countries, or implementing humanitarian parole.

10

See KERRY O’HALLORAN, THE POLITICS OF ADOPTION: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE 132 (2009) (showing that a
receiving country may suspend all adoptions from a sending country that is not
in compliance with Hague Convention guidelines or policy concerns); see also
Annette Schmit, Note, The Hague Convention: The Problems with Accession
and Implementation, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 375, 377 (2008).
11
See MARY ANN LAMANNA, MARRIAGES, FAMILIES AND RELATIONSHIPS:
MAKING CHOICES IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 249 (2009) (stating that Romania and
Russia both placed moratoriums on intercountry adoptions); see also Rebecca
Worthington, Note, The Road to Parentless Children is Paved with Good
Intentions: How the Hague Convention and Recent Intercountry Adoption Rules
are Affecting Potential Parents and the Best Interests of Children, 19 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 559, 585 (2009) (explaining that problems arise when
countries, in trying to comply with the Hague Convention, completely shut off
their intercountry adoption pipeline).
12
See JEAN NELSON-ERICHSEN, INSIDE THE ADOPTION AGENCY:
UNDERSTANDING INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION IN THE ERA OF THE HAGUE
CONVENTION 66 (2007) (finding that moratoriums leave prospective parents
heartbroken); see also Andrea Poe, Government Bars American Family from
Contacting Daughter, THE WASH. TIMES COMMUNITIES (June 21, 2011)
[hereinafter
Poe,
Government
Bars],
available
at
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/red-thread-adoptivefamily-forum/2011/jun/21/government-bars-american-family-contactingdaughte/ (maintaining that foreign adoption moratoriums make adoption
difficult for American parents).
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Background in International Adoption and the
Promulgation of the Hague Convention

International adoption has become increasingly popular and
is advantageous for both sending and receiving countries.13 The
U.S. became a prominent figure in intercountry adoption in the
1950s when the media shed light on the thousands of impoverished
children orphaned during the Korean War.14 Since that time,
American families have been moved by the opportunity to help
children who might otherwise suffer poverty-stricken lives.15
Moreover, because many war-torn countries are too unstable or
financially weak to support orphaned children, they benefit from
providing orphaned children loving homes abroad.16
Changes in the U.S. have also added to the heightened
demand for international adoptions.17 Increased access to birth
control, the legalization of abortion, a greater number of women in
the workforce, and more women delaying childbirth, have all
contributed to the decreasing number of available children for
adoption domestically.18 Moreover, greater social acceptance of
13

See McKinney, supra note 1, at 370–71 (holding that international adoption is
a recent phenomenon that stemmed from various advances in worldwide
communication and transportation).
14
See Nicole Bartner Graff, Note, Intercountry Adoption and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child: Can the Free Market in Children be Controlled, 27
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 405, 405 (2000) (noting that intercountry
adoption has been a growing industry since the 1950s); see also Wittner, supra
note 9, at 598 (noting that intercountry adoption became popular during the
Korean War).
15
See Donovan M. Steltzner, Note, Intercountry Adoption: Toward a Regime
That Recognizes the “Best Interests” of Adoptive Parents, 35 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 113, 117 (2003) (discussing how the reports of substandard living
conditions of children living in the former Soviet Union led many American
families to adopt from there); see also Wittner, supra note 9, at 598 (noting the
trend in American families to open their doors to children of war-torn and
impoverished countries).
16
See Colin Joseph Troy, Comment, Members Only: The Need for Reform in
U.S. Intercountry Adoption Policy, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1525, 1528 (2012);
see also Wittner, supra note 9, at 598 (explaining that American families adopt
from third world countries in order to save children from impoverished lives,
and the fees for adopting internationally are virtually the same as adopting
domestically).
17
See McKinney, supra note 1, at 367 (noting that scientific and cultural
advances have changed the landscape of domestic adoption in the United States
and other industrialized countries); see also Troy, supra note 16, at 1527–528.
18
See UNICEF, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing the contributing factors to the
decline of children available for domestic adoption in industrialized countries);
see also Rachel J. Wechsler, Giving Every Child a Chance: The Need for
Reform and Infrastructure in Intercountry Adoption Policy, 22 PACE INT’L L.
REV. 1, 5 (2010).
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single parenthood has increased the number of people looking to
adopt.19 These factors have resulted in an influx of international
adoptions, leading to more orphaned children being adopted into
Americans homes.20
While international adoption presents advantages, it has
also sparked a black market where children are bought and sold
like property.21 Sending countries, often struggling with poverty,
have developed systems of trading and selling children in order to
meet the increased demand for foreign adoptions by wealthier
receiving nations such as the U.S.22 In Vietnam, for example, field
investigations have found forged documents and cash payments to
birth mothers, demonstrating corrupt practices designed to release
children into orphanages for international adoption.23 Similar
conduct has occurred in a number of the most common sending
countries, including China, Romania, and Guatemala.24
In 1993, the international community promulgated the
Hague Convention in response to growing concern over abuse and

19

See Kathleen Ja Sook Bergquist, International Asian Adoption: In the Best
Interest of the Child?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 343, 346 (2004); see also
McKinney, supra note 1, at 367.
20
See McKinney, supra note 1, at 367 (contrasting low birth rates and increasing
demand for adoption in the U.S. with the high fertility rates of most developing
countries); see also Wittner, supra note 9, at 599.
21
See Wechsler, supra note 18, at 14 (expressing the concern that increased
regulations will not eliminate the black market for babies because of the high
prices individuals are willing to pay); see also Wittner, supra note 9, at 599
(noting that an increase in intercountry adoptions has resulted in the
victimization of children).
22
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL ADOPTIONS, at 6, available at
www.state.gov/documents/organization/28455.pdf
(acknowledging
the
Immigration and Naturalization Service investigative efforts to uncover irregular
practices of private foreign adoption); see also Carlberg, supra note 2, at 121
(finding that countries shift away from looking at the best interests of the
adoptive children and instead toward awarding adoptive children to the highest
bidding prospective parents).
23
See Patricia J. Meier, Note, Small Commodities: How Child Traffickers
Exploit Children and Families in Intercountry Adoption and What the United
States Must Do to Stop Them, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 185, 190 (2008)
(describing that Vietnam stopped accepting American adoption applications
after U.S. field investigations found adoption irregularities); see also
Worthington, supra note 11, at 579 (noting the serious adoption irregularities in
Vietnam found by U.S. field investigations).
24
See D. Marianne Blair, Wells Conference on Adoption Law: Safeguarding the
Interests of Children in Intercountry Adoption: Assessing the Gatekeepers, 34
CAP. U.L. REV. 349, 367–68, 376, 381 (2005) (enumerating various adoption
irregularities in Guatemala, Romania, and China); see also Worthington, supra
note 11, at 559 (listing countries, such as China, Romania, Guatemala, and
Vietnam, that have tightened their regulations or closed their borders due to
global scrutiny of their adoption systems).
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corruption in the international adoption system.25 The Hague
Convention was designed to formalize and unify existing adoption
processes in an effort to eliminate the international child trade.26
While the Hague Convention has brought necessary focus to the
problems associated with international adoption, implementation
of its standards has proven impractical.27
II.

Standards and Effects of the Hague Convention

The Hague Convention is a multilateral treaty that was
ratified in 1993 by sixty-six nations.28 As of August 2012, eightynine countries had ratified the Convention, and an additional two
(Nepal and Haiti) were signatories but not parties to the treaty.29
In 1994, the U.S. signed the Hague Convention, and became a
member country in December 2007.30 A country is considered a
member State once it has signed and ratified the Hague
Convention.31 Upon ratification, member States are legally
obligated to abide by the treaty’s terms and conditions.32
25

See David M. Smolin, Child Laundering and the Hague Convention on
Intercountry Adoption: The Future and Past of Intercountry Adoption, 48 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 441, 451–52 (2010) (discussing the Hague Convention’s
attempt to establish safeguards to protect children in intercountry adoption); see
McKinney, supra note 1, at 365 (describing the development of the Hague
Convention in response to concerns about international adoption systems and the
lack of legal protections for parties involved in the process).
26
See Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction pmbl.,
Oct. 25, 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 ; see also Worthington, supra note 11, at 565.
27
See Briscoe, supra note 4, at 460 (acknowledging that the Hague Convention
needs modification to properly address international child abductions); see also
Melissa S. Wills, Note, Interpreting the Hague Convention on International
Child Abduction: Why American Courts Need to Reconcile the Rights of Noncustodial Parents, the Best Interests of Abducted Children, and the Underlying
Objectives of the Hague Convention, 25 REV. LITIG. 423, 428–29 (2006)
(emphasizing the difficulties of litigating under the Hague Convention).
28
See Mark W. Fraser & Mary A. Terzian, Risk and Resilience in Child
Development: Principles and Strategies of Practice, in CHILD WELFARE FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY: A HANDBOOK OF PRACTICES, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS
436 (Gerald P. Mallon & Peg McCartt Hess eds., 2005).
29
See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L. LAW, STATUS TABLE 33:
CONVENTION ON 29 MAY 1993 ON PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND COOPERATION
IN
RESPECT
OF
INTERCOUNTRY
ADOPTION,
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69 (last visited
Oct. 28, 2012); see also Jennifer A. Ratcliff, Comment, International Adoption:
Improving on the 1993 Hague Convention, 25 MD. J. INT’L L. 336, 340 (2010)
(acknowledging that the Hague Convention attracted many nations and allowed
them to address the need for international adoption regulations).
30
See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L. LAW, supra note 29.
31
See Hague Convention, supra note 5.
32
See Yang v. Tsui, 499 F.3d 259, 270 (3d Cir. 2007) (establishing that a person
can commence judicial proceedings under the Hague Convention in U.S. court);
see also Briscoe, supra note 4, at 439.
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However, nations are not obligated to ratify the treaty or follow its
standards, after they have signed it.33
Signatories to the Hague Convention have committed
themselves to ensuring that intercountry adoptions are made in the
best interests of the children, thereby preventing unethical adoption
practices.34 Moreover, signatories have agreed on three main
objectives for the treaty.35 Those objectives are to: (1) guarantee
that the best interests of the child are served in every intercountry
adoption; (2) design a system of cooperation between countries
that will help prevent the abduction, sale, or trafficking of children;
and (3) secure recognition of adoptions occurring among
contracting countries.36
Despite the good intentions of the Hague Convention, there
is a debate regarding the effectiveness of the treaty. Those in favor
of international adoption hoped that the standards set forth by the
Hague Convention would improve the efficiency of the adoption
system and ensure that each adoption is the result of ethical
practices.37 Instead, the Hague Convention has created a system
that provides little incentive for sending countries to ratify the
treaty, and requires resources that many sending countries do not
have.38 As a result, the Hague Convention has slowed, and in
some instances stopped, the flow of international adoptions.39
33

See Briscoe, supra note 4, at 439 (indicating that signing the Hague
Convention indicates only an intent to become a party, not an obligation to ratify
the Convention); see also Carlberg, supra note 2, at 130 (noting that becoming
party to the Hague Convention does not obligate a state to take further action
toward ratification).
34
See Hague Convention, supra note 5; see also Jane Gross, U.S. Joins
Overseas Adoption Overhaul Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/11/washington/11hague.html (reporting that
the Hague Convention is designed to protect children and parents from unethical
practices such as abduction).
35
See Hague Convention, supra note 5.
36
Id.
37
See Dillon, supra note 8, at 47–48 (noting that adoption advocates wrongly
believed the Hague Convention would lead to an increase in international
adoptions); see also Jena Martin, The Good, the Bad & the Ugly? A New Way of
Looking at the Intercountry Adoption Debate, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POLY
173, 198 (2007) (highlighting the Hague Convention’s goal to standardize
adoption practices among divergent nations).
38
See Kate O’Keefe, The Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000: The United States
Ratification of the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children, and Its
Meager Effect on International Adoption, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L 1611,
1615 (2007) (noting that compliance with Convention requirements is difficult
to meet for countries that are unable or unwilling to invest time or resources);
see also Wittner, supra note 9, at 618.
39
See Dillon, supra note 8, at 48 (noting that adoption advocates hoped the
Hague Convention would encourage governments to question their reliance on
international adoption as a method of child welfare); see also Elizabeth J. Ryan,
Note, For the Best Interest of Children: Why the Hague Convention of
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A. Hague Convention Standards
In order to achieve its three objectives, the Hague
Convention established a number of provisions that must be abided
by member countries and committed to by signatories.40 First, in
order for a child to be adopted, it must be determined through a
number of procedural requirements that adoption is in the best
interests of the child.41 Second, those procedural requirements
must be enforced by a Central Authority, thus preventing the
abduction, sale, or trafficking of any child.42 Last, Contracting
States must recognize certification of an adoption made in
accordance with the Convention’s standards.43
1. Ensuring the Bests Interests of the Child
The Hague Convention first established requirements for
international adoptions aimed at promoting the best interests of the
child.44 Under Article 4, an adoption will only take place if the
State of origin can establish that the child is adoptable, the
adoption is in the child’s best interests, the authorities putting the
child up for adoption give their informed consent, and those
authorities have not received any compensation for the adoption.45
Additionally, under Article 5, the sending country is required to
determine that adoptive parents are eligible and suitable for

Intercountry Adoption Needs to Go Further, As Evidence by Implementation in
Romania and the United States, 29 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 353, 377 (2006)
(proposing that the Hague Convention could better institute its adoption program
by providing assistance with implementation).
40
See Elizabeth Long, Where Are They Coming From, Where Are They Going:
Demanding Accountability in International Adoption, 13 CARDOZO J.L. &
GENDER 827, 837 (2012) (denoting that the Hague Convention requires a
number of checks before a child is eligible for international adoption).
41
See Schmit, supra note 10, at 384–85 (stating that sending countries must
ensure that State placement is in the best interests of the child).
42
See Hague Convention, supra note 5.
43
Id.
44
Id; see also Worthington, supra note 11, at 566 (noting that it remains difficult
for countries to comply with Hague Convention standards, leaving numerous
children on the street or in orphanages).
45
See Hague Convention, supra note 5; see also Lisa Myers, Current Issues in
Public Policy: Preserving the Best Interests of the World’s Children:
Implementing the Hague Treaty on Intercountry Adoption Through PublicPrivate Partnerships, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 780, 794−95 (2009)
(elaborating on the Convention’s requirement for sending countries’ competent
authorities within the adoptee’s country of origin to determine a child’s
adoptability as well as the consent of the biological parents).
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adoption, counsel adoptive parents, and ensure that the child is
legally authorized to live in the receiving country.46
To ensure that the guidelines aimed at the best interests of
the child are followed, Article 6 requires that each Contracting
State designate a Central Authority47 to enforce the duties
established by the Convention.48 Among its many obligations,
Article 16 requires the Central Authority to prepare a report
detailing information about the child’s “identity, adoptability,
background, social environment, family history, medical history
including that of the child’s family, and any special needs of the
child.”49 In consideration of that report, the Central Authority
must determine whether the placement of the child with his or her
prospective parents is in the child’s best interests.50 As a final
safeguard of the child’s best interests, where an adoption is to take
place after the child has been transferred to the receiving state,
Article 21 grants the receiving state’s Central Authority the power
to withdraw the child from the prospective parents and arrange
temporary care if it appears that the placement is no longer in the
child’s best interests.51
2. Promoting the Objectives of the Treaty Thereby
Preventing the Abduction, Sale, and Trafficking of
Children
Under the Convention, Central Authorities must cooperate
with each other and promote the objectives of the treaty, including
the prevention of corrupt adoption practices.52 In order to do so,
46

See Hague Convention, supra note 5; see also Carlberg, supra note 2, at 131
(elaborating on the sending country’s duties under Article 5 to ensure that
prospective parents are eligible to adopt and the children may legally enter their
respective receiving countries).
47
For example, the Department of State serves as the U.S. Central Authority, the
Vietnamese Ministry of Justice serves as Vietnam’s Central Authority, and the
Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China serves as China’s
Central Authority. See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L. LAW, supra
note 29; see also Ann Laquer Estin, Families Across Borders: The Hague
Children’s Conventions and the Case for International Family Law in the
United States, 62 FLA. L. REV. 47, 67 (2010) (detailing the U.S. Department of
State’s position as the U.S. Central Authority as well as the specific office
within the Department that performs Convention-specific duties).
48
See Hague Convention, supra note 5; see also Croft, supra note 6, at 631
addressing the designation of Central Authorities as well as the cooperation
between them to carry out the objectives of the Convention).
49
See Hague Convention, supra note 5.
50
Id.
51
Id. If a child is so removed from the prospective parents, the Central Authority
must arrange, without delay, a new placement of the child, or arrange alternative
long-term care.
52
Id.
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Article 7 requires Central Authorities to exchange information
about their States’ adoption policies with other Central Authorities,
and to collaboratively eliminate any obstacles that would prevent
the application of the treaty.53 Additionally, under Article 8,
Central Authorities are required to prevent any improper gains,
financial or otherwise, with respect to adoptions, and enforce all
the provisions in the treaty.54 However, Article 32 details some
fees that are permissible in international adoption.55 Those fees
include the reasonable costs and expenses of professional persons
involved in an adoption.56 Further, in an effort to prevent wealthy
people seeking to adopt from pressuring birth parents to release
their children to orphanages, Article 29 prohibits contact between
the prospective parents and birth parents of a child until the
requirements of Articles 4 and 5 have been met.57
3. Recognizing Adoptions Made in Accordance with the
Treaty
The Hague Convention requires that all Contracting States
recognize adoptions made in accordance with the laws of the
treaty.58 Recognition of an adoption, according to Article 26,
requires recognition of the legal parent-child relationship between
the child and his or her adoptive parents, and the termination of the
prior legal relationship between the child and his or her birth
parents.59 Under Article 24, a Contracting State may refuse to
recognize an adoption only if the adoption is “manifestly contrary
to its public policy, taking into account the best interests of the
child.”60

53

See id.; see also Peter H. Pfund, The Developing Jurisprudence of the Rights
of the Child: Contributions of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law, 3 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 665, 673 (1997).
54
See Hague Convention, supra note 5; see also Kristina Wilken, Note,
Controlling Improper Financial Gain in International Adoptions, 2 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 85, 90 nn.39–44 (1995).
55
See Hague Convention, supra note 5; see also Holly C. Kennard, Comment,
Curtailing the Sale and Trafficking of Children: A Discussion of the Hague
Convention in Respect of Intercountry Adoptions, 14 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L.
623, 635 (1994).
56
See Hague Convention, supra note 5; see also Smolin, supra note 25, at 178.
57
See Hague Convention, supra note 5 (stressing that there should be no contact
between the prospective parents and the child’s birth parents until certain
requirements are met, unless the adoption takes place within a family or the
contact is in compliance with the conditions set forth by the State of origin); see
also Wittner, supra note 9, at 616 nn.160–61 (depicting that birth parents to
surrender the child, as well as to prevent improprieties from occurring).
58
See Hague Convention, supra note 5.
59
Id.
60
Id.
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B. Effects of the Hague Convention
The Hague Convention presents both achievements and
problems in international adoption practice. On one hand, the
Hague Convention has recognized that international adoption may
be in the best interests of children, and has shed light on the
dangers posed by black markets and the need to reform
international adoption processes. However, the Hague Convention
also poses a number of problems, including its limited application
in a number of developing countries, and the negative effect it has
had on adoptions that were in the pipeline at the time the treaty
was signed.61
1. Hague Convention Achievements
The Hague Convention was the first formal, international
declaration to recognize that international adoption may be a
positive solution for orphaned children.62 Prior to the Hague
Convention, there was general agreement that international
adoption should only be used as a last resort.63 For example, the
United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund
(UNICEF) opposes international adoption for abandoned children
in favor of tracing children to their families within their native
countries.64 The problem with UNICEF’s view is that it does not
acknowledge the trauma that children suffer while they wait for the

61

See Trish Maksew, Child Trafficking and Intercountry Adoption: The
Cambodian Experience, 35 CUMB. L. REV. 619, 622 (2005) (detailing how the
United States temporarily halted adoptions from Cambodia in order to comply
with the Convention); see also Ratcliff, supra note 29, at 336, 344–47
(discussing how some countries, such as Romania, lack the resources to
implement the Convention effectively).
62
See Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Thoughts on the Human
Rights Issues, 13 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 181, 192; see also Ratcliff, supra
note 29, at 336, 344.
63
See Bartholet, supra note 62, at 193 (explaining that the Convention was a
rejection of previous international agreements that favored domestic options
over international adoptions); see also Lisa M. Katz, Comment, A Modest
Proposal? The Convention of Children and Cooperation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, 9 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 283, 303 (1995) (documenting
that the Convention’s proposition that international adoption might take
precedence over domestic options conflicted with prior U.N. documents).
64
See Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 21, G.A. Res. 44/25, 61st plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989) (indicating that UNICEF only
recognizes international adoption as a solution “if the child cannot be placed in a
foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in the
child’s country of origin”); see also Thompson, supra note 2, at 454
(emphasizing the importance of matching children with their biological
families).
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results of the tracing efforts.65 Due to malnutrition and lack of
human contact, among other things, children are at a higher risk of
physical and psychological impairments the longer they remain in
orphanages.66 Thus, while the Hague Convention recognizes that
adoption by a family member is priority,67 it focuses on finding
orphaned or abandoned children permanent families regardless of
where they live, rather than tracing their family ties at any cost.68
However, the Hague Convention’s encouragement of international
adoption will theoretically allow more young children to enjoy a
loving and stable permanent home.
The Hague Convention is the most significant and
ambitious action taken with respect to the protection of children
from the black market, and other corrupt adoption practices.69 The
treaty provides a framework for a uniform system of international
adoption and establishes safeguards that could potentially end child
trafficking.70 The uniformity of adoption laws proposed by the
Hague Convention helps to mediate the problems associated with
the varying levels of protection for orphaned children resulting
from disparate adoption systems.71 Moreover, the focus that the
Hague Convention has placed on corrupt international adoption
practices may lead to further governmental efforts to stop child

65

See Bartholet, supra note 62, at 180 (noting the inadequacies of institutions
for orphans in regards to physical and emotional care); see also Thompson,
supra note 2, at 454 (explaining negative effects of waiting for children’s family
to be traced).
66
See Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of Armed
Conflict on Children, G.A. Res. 57/190, ¶ 72, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/190 (Dec.
18, 2002) (stating that centers for unaccompanied children, such as orphans, are
not able to meet the emotional and developmental needs of children); see also
The Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation, With the
Best Intentions: A Study of Attitudes Towards Residential Care in Cambodia at
20,
21
(2011),
available
at
http://www.unicef.org/eapro/
Study_Attitudes_towards_RC.pdf (discussing a research study by UNICEF
Cambodia Child Protection addressing the socio-emotional and cognitive
development of institutionalized children).
67
See Hague Convention, supra note 5 (stating that each State should take
appropriate measures to enable children to remain in the care of their biological
families).
68
See Bartholet, supra note 62, at 193 (explaining the Convention’s goal to push
for a family environment); see also Ratcliff, supra note 29, at 342.
69
See Ratcliff, supra note 29, at 340 (recognizing the Convention’s success
based upon global outreach); see also Thompson, supra note 2, at 442
(emphasizing the global impact of the Hague Convention).
70
See Troy, supra note 16, at 1544 (arguing that adherence to the Convention’s
standards will further the goal of stopping child trafficking).
71
See Schmit, supra note 10, at 376–77 (establishing that differing legislation
from country to country creates difficulties in preventing corruption in
intercountry adoption).
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trafficking.72 Thus, the Hague Convention has the potential to put
an end to the problems of abuse and corruption in international
adoption practices.
2. Problems Arising from the Hague Convention
While the Hague Convention has its benefits, its stringent
provisions deter developing countries from ratifying the treaty
because they fear adoptions from their country will be suspended,
or they lack the resources necessary to execute its standards. The
Hague Convention offers little incentive for developing countries
to ratify the treaty.73 Although ratifying the Hague Convention
allows developing countries to signal to the world that they are
committed to ethical intercountry adoption policies, that incentive
is not enough for countries with struggling economies that rely on
the lucrative child trafficking trade.74 Moreover, the U.S.
continues to permit adoptions from countries that are not members
of the Hague Convention, while simultaneously placing holds on
adoptions from member countries that do not abide by the Hague
Convention’s standards.75
This inconsistency creates a
disincentive for developing countries to ratify the Hague
Convention because they do not want to risk having the U.S.
suspend adoptions.76 As a result, the Hague Convention is not

72

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AGENCIES
HAVE IMPROVED THE INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION PROCESS, BUT FURTHER
ENHANCEMENTS ARE NEEDED 29 (2005); see also Carlberg, supra note 2, at
133–34.
73
See Kimball, supra note 9, at 564 (establishing that the economic burden of
compliance in conjunction with underlying social and cultural opposition to
intercountry adoption provides little incentive for ratification by major sending
countries).
74
See Sarah Sargent, Suspended Animation: The Implementation of the Hague
Convention on Intercountry Adoption in the United States and Romania, 10
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 351, 358 (2004) (arguing that the economic imbalance
between major sending countries and major receiving countries leads to
criticism of intercountry adoption as an exploitation of developing countries);
see also Wittner, supra note 9, at 618 (stating that little incentive exists for
Cambodia to ratify the treaty when the child trafficking trade adds
approximately $7.5 million per year to its economy).
75
See Andrew C. Brown, Comment, International Adoption Law: A
Comparative Analysis, 43 INT’L LAW 1337, 1363–364 (2009) (explaining that
the United States discontinued adoptions from Guatemala, a member of the
Convention, but continued adoptions from countries that are not parties to the
Convention and have problems with fraudulent adoption practices); see also
Schmit, supra note 10, at 377.
76
See Schmit, supra note 10, at 377 (explaining that the Hague Convention
punishes countries that are members to the Convention, but have yet to
implement its standards, while rewarding non-member countries by allowing
those countries to ignore Convention requirements).
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being signed by the very countries where child trafficking is most
prevalent.77
Even when developing countries ratify the Hague
Convention, they often lack the resources to implement its
provisions.78 While the Hague Convention was designed to work
with several different legal regimes, it is difficult to implement in
countries that struggle with poverty, political discourse, or an
inadequate police force.79 The Hague Convention places a heavy
burden on sending countries to execute the treaty’s provisions.80
Additionally, the Hague Convention requires each member State to
establish a Central Authority to enforce its provisions.81 Those
obligations are extraordinarily costly and nearly impossible for
developing countries to implement without the help of foreign
aid.82 Moreover, the fact that it took the U.S., a country with much
greater political and financial resources than many of the ratifying
countries, more than ten years to implement the Hague Convention
is a testament to how difficult it is to comply with its standards.83
77

See Briscoe, supra note 4, at 451; see also Wittner, supra note 9, at
617.
78
See O'Keefe, supra note 38, at 1615 (explaining that many developing
countries lack the funds to fully comply with the Hague Convention); see also
Wittner, supra note 9, at 625.
79
See Carlberg, supra note 2, at 127 (noting that some receiving countries are
skeptical of adopting children from sending countries that are without the
economic means to enact necessary safeguards against corrupt adoption
practices); see also Schmit, supra note 10, at 390.
80
See Kimball, supra note 9, at 563 (noting that the Hague Convention favors
receiving countries who tend to be wealthier and thus able to shoulder a larger
economic burden than the sending countries). For example, sending countries
are responsible for investigating birth and adoptive families, and combating
corrupt adoption practices. See Wittner, supra note 9, at 617.
81
See Hague Convention, supra note 5 (delegating a Central Authority to
implement and enforce its provisions).
82
See Carlberg, supra note 2, at 147 (observing that the start-up costs to
implement the Hague Convention’s provisions are impossibly high for
developing countries); see also Katherine Sohr, Note, Difficulties Implementing
the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-Operation in
Respect of Intercountry Adoption: A Criticism of the Proposed Ortega’s Law
and an Advocacy for Moderate Adoption Reform in Guatemala, 18 PACE INTL.
L. REV. 559, 582–83 (2006) (stating that the main problem with the Hague
Convention’s proposed reforms is inadequate funding for developing countries
to revamp their adoption programs).
83
See McKinney, supra note 1, at 391 (stressing that even a country with greater
power struggled to implement the Hague Convention regulations). The extended
delay in U.S. ratification of the Hague Convention was caused by conflicts
between the U.S. Department of State and American adoption experts on how to
best implement the Convention’s standards. Because intercountry adoption
policies in the U.S. were regulated by state governments rather than the federal
government prior to the Hague Convention, the U.S. had to restructure its
adoption system before it could ratify the treaty. See Laura Beth Daly, Note, To
Regulate or Not to Regulate: The Need for Compliance with International
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When a country ratifies the Hague Convention but is
unable to implement its provisions, there is a risk that the country
will place a hold on its outgoing adoptions. For example, while
Romania was one of the first countries to ratify the Hague
Convention, corruption ensued when it attempted to improve its
adoption system.84 Because the Romanian government was unable
to quell the corruption, it issued a moratorium on international
adoptions in 2001.85 Political debate over international adoption
and inadequate financing has resulted in Romania’s inability to
meet the standards of the Hague Convention.86 Consequently,
Romania’s moratorium has left more than 80,000 Romanian
children without permanent families.87
Moratoriums imposed by the U.S. upon countries that do
not comply with the Hague Convention also pose problems for
those involved in international adoptions. The U.S., as the
receiving country of the greatest number of international adoptions
worldwide,88 monitors the ethical standing of sending countries’
adoption processes.89 When the U.S. Department of State finds
that a country has not signed the Hague Convention or is not
meeting Hague Convention standards, it may suspend adoptions
from that country.90 However, by banning adoptions from such
countries, the U.S. limits its citizens’ adoption options, and
abandons countries that have little hope of implementing the
Hague Convention on their own.91

Norms by Guatemala and Cooperation by the United States in Order to
Maintain Intercountry Adoptions, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 620, 623 (2007).
84
See Ratcliff, supra note 29, at 345 (expanding on Romania’s difficulties in
implementing the Hague Convention’s requirements).
85
Id. (noting that the Romanian government issued a temporary moratorium on
international adoptions in 2001 in order to reform their adoption system).
86
Id. at 345–56.
87
Id. at 346.
88
See UNICEF, supra note 3 (stating that the U.S. is responsible for
approximately half of all foreign adoptions).
89
See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of State and Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Joint
Statement on Suspension of Processing for New Adoption Cases Based on
Abandonment in Nepal (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2010/08/145767.htm (stating that the U.S. Department of State investigated
Nepal’s child abandonment reports and found them unreliable).
90
See Carlberg, supra note 2, at 127 (noting that the U.S. refuses to participate
in intercountry adoption proceedings with sending countries that mistreat
orphaned children, are known for child trafficking, or have otherwise corrupt
adoption practices); see also Gross, supra note 34 (commenting on how the U.S.
threatened to suspend adoptions from Guatemala because of corruption claims,
even though the country ratified the Hague Convention).
91
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 1 (displaying the sharp decrease in U.S.
adoptions from Guatemala); see also Schmit, supra note 10, at 391–92
(emphasizing the effect of a U.S. ban on Guatemalan adoptions).
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The U.S. moratorium on adoptions from Cambodia
exemplifies some of the serious and long-term effects that a ban
can have on international adoption. In 2001, the U.S. placed a
moratorium on adoptions from Cambodia because Cambodia did
not sign the Hague Convention.92 Although Cambodia became a
party to the Hague Convention in 2007, and ratified the treaty in
2009, the U.S. reconfirmed its moratorium on Cambodia in 2009
because of concerns that Cambodia was not properly implementing
the standards of the Hague Convention.93 Since the ban, mortality
among children in Cambodia has steadily risen.94 Further, because
Cambodia has a law prohibiting the adoption of children over the
age of eight years old, there is a growing concern that the
continuing moratorium will cause many orphaned children to lose
the opportunity to ever have a permanent family, merely because
of their age.95 By banning adoptions from a country attempting to
satisfy Hague Convention standards, the U.S. ignores the
underlying problems causing that country to fall short of the
treaty’s standards. Moreover, the bans severely impact orphaned
children who will remain without permanent families indefinitely
or until the U.S. is satisfied that the country has complied with the
Hague Convention.
III.

Pipeline Families and The Efforts to Complete Their
Adoptions

The adoption moratoriums on countries that are unwilling
or unable to implement the Hague Convention standards have
created a problem for adoptions that were approved yet incomplete
prior to when the bans were placed.96 The adoptive parents and
92

See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, INS Announces Suspension of
Cambodian Adoptions and Offer of Parole in Certain Pending Cases (Dec. 21,
2001) (announcing the United States’ immediate suspension of Cambodian
adoption petitions); see also Wittner, supra note 9, at 619 (recounting the United
States’ imposition of a ban on Cambodian adoptions as a method for preventing
intercountry adoption fraud).
93
See CONGRESSIONAL COALITION ON ADOPTION INSTITUTE, COUNTRY UPDATE:
CAMBODIA, http://www.ccainstitute.org/country-update-cambodia.html (last
visited Sept. 18, 2012). The Cambodian government continues to make efforts
to better its adoption system and expects, with U.S. recognition, to receive
adoption proposals in April 2012.
94
See UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND (UNICEF), CAMBODIA STATISTICS,
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/cambodia_statistics.html (last visited Sept.
18, 2012) (showing an increase in the mortality rates of children under the age
of five in Cambodia from 2000 to 2010).
95
See Thompson, supra note 2, at 451 (assessing how some children have lost
their chance to be adopted because they have turned eight years old).
96
See Worthington, supra note 11, at 585 (critiquing the Hague Convention’s
failure to consider the effects of compliance on pending adoptions); see also
Mireya Navarro, To Adopt, Please Press Hold, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2008,
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children in those situations, known as “pipeline families,” have
been forced to put their adoptions on hold, while the Contracting
States determine what additional guidelines must be met before the
adoptions can be completed.97 The delay in these adoptions has
created a number of problems, including the deterioration of the
mental and physical health of the adopted children as they continue
to live in orphanages or foster homes.98
While countries attempt to understand the steps the Hague
Convention requires them to take in order to complete these
adoptions in the pipeline, the adopted children are left to live in
orphanages with little to no contact with their adoptive families.99
During this time, adoptive parents have banded together to form
support groups, file petitions, and coordinate marches in hopes of
persuading the U.S. government to remedy their tragic
situations.100 Unfortunately, the U.S. government has provided
little insight into how pipeline adoptions can be completed, leaving
these families to wonder if they will ever be united with their
adopted children.101
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/05/fashion/05adopt.html (revealing the effects
of tightened U.S. regulations on American adoptive parents seeking to adopt
children in Guatemala and Vietnam).
97
See Andrea Poe, Step Forward for Orphans March: American Families to
Protest U.S. Policies, THE WASH. TIMES COMMUNITIES, Aug. 15, 2011,
[hereinafter Poe, Step Forward], http://communities.washingtontimes.com/
neighborhood/red-thread-adoptive-family-forum/2011/aug/15/separated-theirchildren-us-policies-american-fami/ (announcing that pipeline families are
staging marches to urge the U.S. government to finalize adoption policies that
remain in a state of uncertainty).
98
See Andrea Poe, Happy Endings: America[n] Family Nick and Lori LeRoy
Fight Bureaucracy to Bring their Son Home, THE WASH. TIMES COMMUNITIES,
Apr.
23,
2012,
[hereinafter
Poe,
Happy
Endings],
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/red-thread-adoptivefamily-forum/2012/apr/23/america-family-fight-bureaucracy-bring-their-son-h/
(stating that the working orphanage in the Vietnamese Bac Lieu province is a
former prison camp with minimal medical and educational supplies).
99
See Poe, Happy Ending, supra note 98.
100
See Bring Home the Bac Lieu Orphans, PETITION2CONGRESS,
http://www.petition2congress.com/4665/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2011)
(petitioning Congress for help to unite pipeline parents with their adopted
children from Vietnam); see also Poe, Step Forward, supra note 97 (explaining
that pipeline parents have coordinated a march on Washington, D.C. to raise
awareness for their cause).
101
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, GUATEMALA UPDATE, http://adoption.state.gov/
country_information/country_specific_alerts_notices.php?alert_notice_type=not
ices&alert_notice_file=guatemala_9 (last visited October 31, 2012) (indicating
that some American adoption cases pending in Guatemala were closed between
2011 and 2012 after the children were reunited with their biological parents or
placed in domestic adoption); see also Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12
(illustrating that even if Vietnam ratifies the Hague Convention, its Central
Authority may match children with different adoptive parents and thus preclude
pipeline parents from uniting with their children).
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A. The Plight of Pipeline Families
There are hundreds of U.S. families who are caught in
limbo as intercountry adoption regulations shift to comply with the
Hague Convention.102 In those cases, prospective parents were
matched with specific children, and have waited as long as three
years to bring their children to the U.S.103 In many cases, the
adoptive parents have met with their adopted children and spent
quality time with them before their adoptions were completed.104
Prior to their adoptions being put on hold, pipeline parents
provided their adopted children with “medical care, emotional
support, toys, books, and clothing” while the children lived in their
countries of origin.105 After the hold, the U.S. Department of State
stopped many of those families from visiting, writing, and calling
their children.106 Moreover, living alone in these orphanages puts
pipeline children at an increased risk of damage to their cognitive,

102

See Nacha Cattan, Guatemala to Renew Adoptions Halted Midway by Ban,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 22, 2011, http://news.yahoo.com/guatemala-renewadoptions-halted-midway-ban-223337120.html (stating that there are currently
an estimated 400 pipeline cases in Guatemala alone).
103
See Mary McCarty, Area Family Caught in International Adoption Dispute,
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, May 28, 2011, http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/
news/local/area-family-caught-in-international-adoption-dispu/nMrsS/ (telling
the
story of a family that has been waiting over two years to adopt due to their
pipeline
status); see also Poe, Step Forward, supra note 97 (arguing that due to
intercountry
adoption administrative procedures, many children are placed in orphanages for
long
periods as their adoptions are processed).
104
See Steve Freiss, 40 U.S. Families Allowed to Adopt Cambodian Kids, USA
TODAY, Mar. 31, 2002, http://www.usatoday.com/news /healthscience/health/
child/2002-04-01-cambodia-adoption.htm (stating that many prospective parents
have moved to their child’s country of origin to stay with them while their
adoption is processed); see also Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12 (reporting
on a family from Florida who spent years in Vietnam with their child before
they could bring him to the United States).
105
See Poe, Rubio Blocks Obama’s Nominee for Vietnamese Ambassador,
WASH. TIMES COMMUNITIES, May 23, 2011, [hereinafter Poe, Rubio Blocks],
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/red-thread-adoptivefamily-forum/2011/may/23/rubio-blocks-obama-nominee-vietnam-ambassador/
(stating that prior to Senator Marco Rubio’s temporary hold on President
Obama’s nominee for ambassador to Vietnam, prospective parents provided
their child with many of the basic necessities of life while the child was in
Vietnam).
106
See Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12 (addressing the fact that many
families who continuously contacted their Vietnamese child have lost virtually
all contact with their child).
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social, and physical well-beings.107 Thus, the longer these children
live in orphanages, the more difficult it will be for them to
assimilate into their new homes when, or if, they are permitted to
live with their adoptive families in the U.S.108
The Hague Convention does not provide any procedure for
resolving the problems created for adoptions in the pipeline when
moratoriums are placed on countries struggling to comply with the
treaty’s standards.109
Consequently, in countries where
moratoriums have been placed, there is little direction for pipeline
families who wait for a governmental solution to their problem.110
In most of these cases, pipeline parents already have paperwork
indicating DNA matches between the pipeline children and their
birth mothers, and relinquishment of the birth mothers’ rights to
their children.111 Yet, as pipeline children’s countries of origin
attempt to comply with Hague Convention standards, pipeline
parents are forced to jump through more hoops.112 Despite their
willingness to comply with the adoption regulations of both
contracting countries, pipeline parents are still prohibited from
bringing their children to the U.S.
107

See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, IMPACT OF ADOPTION ON
ADOPTIVE PARENTS, http://www.childwelfare.gov/ pubs/factsheets/ impact_
parent/index.cfm (last visited Sep. 20, 2012) (emphasizing that adoptive parents
should be weary of the impact on the child’s psyche from their stay in an
orphanage and their life with their biological parents); see also Nepal Adoptions,
HOPE’S PROMISE, http://www.hopespromise.com/adoption/international/nepaladoptions/ (last visited Sep. 25, 2012) (arguing that institutionalization of a child
early in their life puts them at an increased risk of psychological disorders).
108
See Nepal Adoptions, supra note 107 (arguing that adopted children waiting
in orphanages need to be brought to America as soon as possible because early
intervention is the key to treating any psychological problems these child may
have); see also Dr. Ronald S. Federici, Psy.D., Raising the Post-Institutionalized
Child: Risks, Challenges and Innovative Treatment, CARE FOR CHILDREN INT’L,
http://www.drfederici.com/raising_child.htm (last visited Sep. 20, 2012) (stating
that the longer the prospective child has been institutionalized, the more he has
been deprived from invaluable social interactions).
109
See Worthington, supra note 11, at 585 (suggesting that even though there are
no alternative procedures in place, there are solutions preferable to a complete
termination of intercountry adoptions).
110
See Nancy Bartley, Parents Caught in Adoption Dispute, THE SEATTLE
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2011, available at http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/
2013818275_adopt01m.html; see also Poe, Step Forward, supra note 97.
111
See O'Keefe, supra note 38, at 1619–624 (discussing the role DNA samples
and statements of relinquishment play in preventing the trafficking of children);
see also Poe, Rubio Blocks, supra note 105.
112
See Nok-Noi Ricker, Orrington Family Fights to Bring Nepalese Child
Home, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Dec. 24, 2010, http://bangordailynews.com/
2010/12/24/news/bangor/orrington-family-fights-to-bring-nepalese-child-home/
(stating that the U.S. Department of State requires more from pipeline parents
adopting from Nepal despite the State Department’s finding that there was no
fraud involved with their adoptions).
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B. Case Studies: Pipeline Adoptions from Vietnam and
Nepal
While developing countries struggle to meet the standards
of the Hague Convention, pipeline children continue to live in substandard conditions, without adequate food, medical attention,
education, or caring adult interaction.113 At the same time,
pipeline parents grapple with shifting adoption requirements in the
children’s countries of origin as they strive to bring their children
home to the U.S.114 Analyses of the pipeline adoptions in Vietnam
and Nepal demonstrate the hardships faced by pipeline parents and
children during the tumultuous process of international adoption in
accordance with Hague Convention standards.
1. Vietnam
In 2008, the U.S. and Vietnamese governments jointly
banned adoptions from Vietnam to the U.S. based on allegations of
fraud and corruption in Vietnam’s adoption system.115 As a result,
hundreds of adoptions between American families and orphaned
children in Vietnam were halted.116 As of 2008, most of the 534
outstanding adoptions have been resolved under exceptions to the
moratorium, yet sixteen cases remained, allegedly because of
mistakes made by an adoption worker in Vietnam,117 until January
2012.118
113

See Poe, Step Forward, supra note 97 (remarking that these squalid
conditions cause pipeline children to suffer from severe illnesses which
often result in hospitalization); see also Nepal Adoptions, supra note 107
(reiterating the deplorable conditions pipeline children are forced to live in and
the negative effects it has on their development).
114
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, NOTICE: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO
DELAY RESUMING ADOPTIONS IN VIETNAM, http://adoption.state.gov/country
_information/country_specific_alerts_notices.php?alert_notice_type=notices&al
ert_notice_file=vietnam_4 (last visited Sep. 18, 2012) (stating that adoptions
between the United States and Vietnam would continue to be on hold until
Vietnam fully complied with the provisions of the Hague Convention). See Poe,
Step Forward, supra note 97 (declaring a lack of urgency in the drafting of
acceptable adoption laws and procedures has exacerbated the wait time for
parents, and has kept families separated for years at a time).
115
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VIETNAM, http://adoption.State.gov/
countryinformation/country_specific_info.php?country-select=vietnam
(last
visited Oct. 31, 2012) (stating that adoptions between the United States and
Vietnam have been halted in the wake of alleged concerns arising out of
Vietnam).
116
See E. J. Graff, Anatomy Of An Adoption Crisis, FOREIGN POL’Y, Sept. 12,
2010,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles
/2010/09/07/anatomy_
of_an_adoption_crisis (describing American families being stonewalled by
politicians and disallowed from concluding their adoptions).
117
See Chris Glorioso, Orphans in Limbo as Vietnamese Adoptions Stall, NBC
NEW YORK, July 16, 2011, http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Orphans-in-
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The pipeline parents of the sixteen remaining cases waited
for three years to bring their adopted children home to the U.S.,
while the pipeline children remained in an orphanage in the Bac
Lieu province.119 In the orphanage, which was previously used as
a prison, the children ate, slept, and bathed in a single room.120
Paint peeled on the orphanage walls, and ants covered the floors,
leaving the children with bites and welts.121 The poor sanitary
conditions in the orphanage led most of the children to contract
pneumonia and many to be hospitalized.122 Moreover, one
pipeline parent explained that the children were “starved for love,”
and “the minute an adult comes into the room, they swarm . . . to
be held and touched.”123 Meanwhile, in the U.S., suffering
pipeline parents did not give up hope that their children would one
day sleep in the nurseries they prepared, and wear the clothes that
were purchased for them.124
Before these pipeline adoptions were halted, many pipeline
parents visited their adopted children in the Bac Lieu orphanage
Limbo-as-Vietnamese-Adoptions-Stall--125674053.html (detailing the events
that led to the ‘Bac Lieu Sixteen’).
118
See Kelly Ensslin, Fixing the International Adoption Mess, GLOBALPOST,
May
20,
2012,
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpostblogs/commentary/fixing-the-international-adoption-mess (adding that eleven of
the sixteen Bac Lieu children were able to go home to their American families
by January 2012); see also Poe, Happy Ending, supra note 98 (interviewing a
set of adoptive parents who were not able to bring their son home until January
2012 amid growing pressure on the Vietnamese government).
119
See Rah Bickley & John O’Brien, Waiting For Their Families, THE HERALD
SUN, July 26, 2011, http://www.heraldsun.com/view/full_story/14836738/
article-July-26 (affirming that sixteen toddlers were held behind in the Bac Lieu
province); see also Margie Mason, 16 Vietnamese Kids, US Families in
Adoption Limbo, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 15, 2011, http://seattletimes.com/
html/nationworld/2015321480_apasvietnamorphansinlimbo.html
(explaining
that issues with paperwork delayed the children in Bac Lieu from being united
with their adoptive parents in the United States).
120
See Poe, Happy Ending, supra note 98 (describing the orphanage as terribly
underfunded with minimal educational and health supplies); see also Poe,
Government Bars supra note 12 (detailing the dilapidated conditions at the
orphanage).
121
See Ensslin, supra note 118 (commenting that many of the children suffered
from decayed teeth and various skin ailments due to the conditions in the
orphanage); see also Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12 (explaining that the
orphanage was infested with insects).
122
See Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12 (describing the inadequate health
conditions at the Bac Lieu orphanage).
123
See David Markiewicz, An Orphan’s Odyssey; ‘When Am I Coming to
America?’, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, April 30, 2006, at 1A
(illustrating how quickly a strong bond develops between orphans and adults
they see as parental figures); see also Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12
(analyzing the interaction between orphans and adults).
124
See Mason, supra note 119 (explaining how the consequences from delays in
adoption are felt and embodied within the adoptive parents’ homes).
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while they waited for their adoptions to go through.125 One couple
visited their daughter nine times in failed attempts to bring her
home.126 Another father, who expected imminent finalization of
his daughter’s adoption documents, stayed with his daughter for
two months before returning to the U.S. without her.127 In that
case, the father soon learned that the Vietnamese government
found his family’s adoption packet incomplete, despite approval
from the U.S. government.128 In December 2010, the U.S.
Embassy told the sixteen pipeline families to cease all contact with
their children until Vietnam signed the Hague Convention, and
explained that contact during that time would be detrimental to
their cases.129
Ironically, the pipeline father described above met all of the
Hague Convention’s standards.130 For example, even though DNA
testing was not required when he first filed his adoption papers, he
obtained DNA confirmation of his adopted child’s birth mother
after the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
issued its new DNA regulations.131 Moreover, he obtained records
that indicate the birth mother’s relinquishment of her parental
rights to the child, and her approval of the adoption by his
American family.132 Despite following all of the old and new
adoption rules in both the U.S. and Vietnam,133 his pipeline
adoption remained in limbo for three years.134
125

See Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12 (detailing the amount of contact
pipeline parents had with their children while their adoptions were put on hold).
126
See Mason, supra note 119.
127
See Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12 (describing how the international
adoption process can be longer and more difficult than anticipated by parents).
128
Id. (noting that the United States signed off on the particular adoption but the
Vietnamese government failed to do so); see also Poe, Rubio Blocks, supra note
105 (describing the changing regulations in both States as hindering attempts by
the adoptive parents to bring their adoptive children to the United States).
129
See Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., USCIS Unable to Resume Processing Adoptions from Vietnam
(Feb. 2, 2011) (on file with author) (noting that USCIS announced that they
would not resume new adoption cases until Vietnam acceded to and complied
with the Hague Adoption Convention); see also Poe, Government Bars, supra
note 12 (noting the U.S. embassy’s declaration that adoptive parents should
cease contact with their adoptive children and orphanages).
130
See Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12 (noting that the pipeline father met
all of the major criteria established in the Hague Convention); see also Poe,
Rubio Blocks, supra note 105 (describing the hurdles adoptive parents had to
navigate even after complying with all treaty regulations).
131
See Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., supra note 129.
132
See Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12.
133
Id.
134
See Angela Ganote, Families Bring Vietnamese Orphans Home Following
Three Year Fight, FOX 59 NEWS, http://www.fox59.com/news/wxin-familiesbring-vietnamese-orphans-home-following-three-year-fight-
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Fortunately, in January 2012, eleven of the sixteen Bac
Lieu children were united with their families in the U.S.135 While
Vietnam ratified the Hague Convention on November 1, 2011, the
treaty was not entered into force until February 1, 2012.136 The
united pipeline families are thrilled to finally have their adopted
children home in the U.S., yet they remain concerned about the
children who are still being denied the right to join their adoptive
parents in the U.S.137 Moreover, the three years that the pipeline
children waited in the orphanage has taken its toll. For example,
one pipeline child’s teeth rotted out at the orphanage, requiring
extensive dental work costing more than $6,000 when he was
united with his pipeline family in the U.S.138 While most of the
Bac Lieu children were finally united with their adoptive parents in
the U.S., the U.S. Department of State announced on February 2,
2012 that it will not resume intercountry adoptions with Vietnam
because Vietnam allegedly has not met its obligations under the
treaty.139 Thus, the future of intercountry adoption between the
U.S. and Vietnam remains uncertain.
2. Nepal
Unlike the ban on international adoption in Vietnam, the
U.S. Department of State is solely responsible for the moratorium
on adoptions from Nepal.140 In August 2010, the U.S. Department
of State and USCIS suspended all new adoption cases involving
children who were reported abandoned based on a finding that
Nepalese adoption documents were unreliable.141 As a result,
20111228,0,4828110.column (detailing the three year struggle to receive their
adopted child).
137
See Ensslin, supra note 118.
139
Id.
140
See Poe, Happy Ending, supra note 98.
141
Sharon Vanepps, After a Three-year Fight, an Indiana Family Finally Brings
Home Their Son from Vietnam, WHATEVER THINGS ARE TRUE: THE GOOD, THE
BAD, AND THE BEAUTIFUL IN THE WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION (Apr.
24,
2012),
http://whateverthingsaretrue.typepad.com/whatever
_things_are_true_/2012/04/after-a-three-year-fight-an-indiana-family-finallybrings-home-their-son-from-vietnam.html.
142
See Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., USCIS Unable to Resume Processing Adoptions from Vietnam
(Feb. 2, 2011) (on file with author).
140
See Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., U.S. Suspends Processing New Nepal Adoption Cases Based on
Abandonment (Aug. 6, 2010) (on file with author).
141
Id. (explaining that the Department of Justice and Unites States Citizenship
and Immigration Services stopped processing adoptions due to the lack of
documentation that the children were actually abandoned); see also Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of State Bureau of Pub. Affairs, Joint Statement on
Suspension of Processing for New Adoption Cases Based on Abandonment in
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approximately 80 pipeline adoptions were halted, 54 of which
remain unresolved.142
Despite the fact that USCIS investigators found no
evidence of fraud in the 54 pipeline adoptions, USCIS is requiring
pipeline parents to prove that their adopted children were not
abandoned before they can obtain visas.143 USCIS officials claim
that the heightened requirements ensure that pipeline children were
not forcefully removed from their biological families.144 However,
critics argue that the requirements are impossible to meet, given
the poor record-keeping and absence of a birth certificate system in
Nepal.145 Given that the USCIS has not found fraud with respect
to these adoptions, pipeline families argue that they should be
granted visas for their children to be brought home to the U.S.146
However, the State Department continues to require pipeline
parents to prove the absence of fraud, opting for a ‘guilty until
proven innocent’ burden of proof regarding the abandonment
status of pipeline children.147
The new regulations for pipeline adoptions in Nepal are
financially strenuous on pipeline parents. In order to prove the
absence of fraud, pipeline parents are required to a hire a private
investigator in Nepal and an attorney in the U.S., costing
approximately $10,000.148 As a result, at least one pipeline family

Nepal (Aug. 6, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/08/145767.html (indicating that a great deal of documents are fabricated, while
other documents are completely unavailable).
142
See Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., supra note 141; see also Bartley, supra note 110.
143
See Bartley, supra note 110 (noting that visas will be granted contingent on
proof that the child was actually abandoned); see also David Crary, Despite
Hurdles, Families Pursue Nepal Adoptions, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 22,
2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/22/despite-hurdles-families_n_812618.html (stating that adoptions were suspended because officials
discovered that some of the children being adopted were not orphans).
144
See Bartley, supra note 110 (explaining that the reason behind proof of
abandonment is to avoid situations where biological parents are still looking for
their children).
145
John R. Crook, United States Suspends Processing of Adoptions of
Abandoned Children From Nepal, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 661, 661 (2010)
(explaining that among the documents needed to prove that a child is not
abandoned are a birth certificate, and orphanage and police records); see also
Bartley, supra note 110.
146
See Bartley, supra note 110 (indicating that no other requirement should be
needed where no evidence of fraud is found).
147
See Habiba Nosheen & Lisa Desa, Nepal: Adoption Limbo,
http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/nepal-adoption-orphanage-children-legitimacy
(last visited Sept. 19, 2012) (stating that families had to provide ample proof that
their children were not trafficked and their adoptions were not fraudulent).
148
See Ricker, supra note 112 (uncovering the high costs of hiring a private
investigator and attorney for the adoption process); see also Crary, supra note
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is selling their house in order to bring their daughter home from
Nepal.149 Other pipeline parents have taken out loans, or asked
their family and friends for donations.150 Some parents risk their
careers and incomes while they visit Nepal for various lengths of
time.151
While pipeline parents are allowed to contact or even live
with their adopted children in Nepal, those privileges raise a
number of concerns, particularly when the family is unable to live
with their child. Pipeline parents that are able to live with their
children in Nepal must give up their lives for an indefinite period
of time.152 They sacrifice their jobs, and time with their families
and friends in the U.S., yet they take comfort in knowing that their
adopted children are safe.153 On the other hand, many pipeline
parents do not have the option of leaving their careers and families
in the U.S. to live abroad, and therefore, must remain separated
from their adopted children.154 The children of pipeline parents
who do not live with them continue to live in orphanages,155 which
experts say can cause psychological and physical damage to the
children.156 Orphanages struggle to provide the children with their
basic needs, including nutritious diets and medical attention.157
Furthermore, the orphanages are kept cold,158 made only worse by
a short supply of clothing and blankets for the children.159 Not
143 (recognizing the high financial costs that families have had to pay in order
to complete the adoption process).
149
See Nepal Adoptions, supra note 107; see also Crary, supra note 143 (noting
that one family had to sell their condominium to defray the high costs of the
adoption process).
150
See Nepal Adoptions, supra note 107.
151
See Monica Brady-Myerof, Revere Women Questions Frustrating Nepalese
Adoption, Fraud Claims, 90.9 WBUR, May 11, 2011, available at
http://www.wbur.org/2011/05/-11/nepaladoption-2 (explaining that one parent
had to take unpaid leave to go to Nepal and subsequently lost her job when she
returned to the United States); see also Nepal Adoptions, supra note 107.
152
See Bartley, supra note 110.
153
Id. (stating that pipeline parents who remain in Nepal risk their retirement
savings and homes, because they consider the security of their children more
important).
154
Id.
155
Id. (illustrating the worries of parents who had to return to the U.S. and leave
their children behind).
156
See Bartholet, supra note 62, at 124 (emphasizing that the longer children
spend in orphanages, the less chance they have at normal development).
157
See Crary, supra note 143.
158
See Bartley, supra note 110 (highlighting the fact that the orphanages are
cold and the children often do not have enough clothing and blankets to keep
warm).
159
See Krithika Varagur, On Poverty and Beauty at a Nepal Orphanage,
SENTINEL,
May
5,
2010,
http://medm.gmnews.com/news/2010-0505/Front_Page/On_poverty_and_beauty_at_a_Nepal_orphanage.html
(describing how six Nepali orphans had to share three sets of clothing).
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only do pipeline families struggle with the knowledge that their
adopted children are living in an orphanage,160 but they must also
share their heartache every time their visits end.161 Regardless of
whether the pipeline parents live in Nepal or the U.S., every family
struggles with the fact that they cannot begin their new lives
together in the U.S.162
C. Steps to Remedy the Problem
Because the halting of pipeline adoptions stems from
countries imposing the new Hague Convention standards, little has
been done to rectify the issue.163 The pipeline adoption problem is
one of governmental regulation,164 and thus, parents can only
petition the government for help to bring their children home.165
While the pleas of the pipeline families for governmental action
have not gone completely unheard,166 the U.S. government has
failed to rectify the situation.167 Despite the efforts of some
politicians to take action, their efforts have been mostly futile.168

160

See Bartholet, supra note 62, at 165.
See Bartley, supra note 110 (quoting a parent who discussed the heartbreak a
child would feel if her was not finalized).
162
See Monica Brady-Myerov, Revere Woman Questions Frustrating Nepalese
Adoption, Fraud Claims, 90.9 WBUR, May 11, 2011, available at
http://www.wbur.org/2011/05/-11/nepaladoption-2 (explaining the struggle of
one pipeline parent who was forced to leave her job and take out a home equity
line of credit when she moved to Nepal for five months in order to bring her
adopted daughter to the United States).
163
See Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., supra note 141.
164
See Bartholet, supra note 62, at 167 (indicating that in order to complete an
international adoption, parents must comply with all United States federal, state,
and sending country’s laws).
165
See Monica Brady-Myerov, Stuck in Nepal: Local Woman in Adoption
Nightmare, 90.9 WBUR, Oct. 8, 2010, available at http://www.wbur.org/
2010/10/08/nepal-adoption (indicating that there is little parents can do to
combat the moratorium placed by the United States).
166
See Crownover, supra note 163 (detailing the contact between a pipeline
family and several U.S. congresspersons).
167
See Bartley, supra note 110; see also Poe, Step Forward, supra note 97
(opining that a lack of governmental urgency has exacerbated the struggles of
pipeline families).
168
Compare Poe, Rubio Blocks, supra note 105 (explaining that Senators Rubio
and Lugar attempted to block the appointment of an ambassador to Vietnam in
an effort to secure information about the status of assistance to pipeline
families), with U.S. Dep’t of State, Biography of David Shear, EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES IN HANOI, VIETNAM, http://vietnam.usembassy.gov/
ambassador.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2012) (noting that the ambassador to
Vietnam was appointed on August 4, 2011).
161
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1. Steps Taken by Pipeline Parents
Pipeline parents have used several mechanisms to bring the
U.S. government’s attention to the pipeline adoption problem. For
example, the pipeline parents of children in Vietnam petitioned
Congress, asking for help from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
and the Prime Minister of Vietnam to explore solutions for the
speedy resolution of pipeline adoptions.169 The pipeline parents of
children in Nepal have also started a petition to Congress,
requesting that members of Congress continue to urge the U.S.
Department of State and USCIS to resolve the pipeline adoptions
in Nepal immediately.170 Moreover, these families have submitted
hundreds of letters directly to President Obama, asking for his
intervention to help bring their children home quickly and
safely.171
Many Americans argue that the pipeline adoption issue is
not getting necessary media coverage. Internet blogs, such as “Red
Thread: An Adoptive Family Forum,” are filled with comments
from pipeline parents and their supporters who are outraged by the
lack of media and governmental support for pipeline families.172
One pipeline mother commented that it is a “tragedy that [the U.S.]
government does not see the urgency in getting these children
home with their waiting families.173 Another pipeline parent
questioned what it will take to reform international adoption, and
thanked those on the Red Thread blog for bringing awareness to
her cause.174 Most bloggers demand to know where the television
169

See Petition2Congress, supra note 100 (showing that, as of October
2012, over 13,500 letters and emails were sent to the U.S. Congress as a result
of the petition).
170
See Petition2Congress, Your Continued Support for the Eighty Nepal
Pipeline Families, http://www.petition2congress.com/3710/ (last visited Oct. 31,
2012) (showing that, as of October 2012, over 2,100 letters and emails were sent
to the U.S. Congress as a result of the petition).
171
See Nepal Adoptions, supra note 107; see also Crary, supra note 143
(chronicling the efforts of pipeline families to bring their adopted children to the
U.S., including petitioning President Obama).
172
See
RED
THREAD:
AN
ADOPTIVE
FAMILY
FORUM,
http://communities.washingtontimes.-com/neighborhood/red-thread-adoptivefamily-forum/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (displaying a collection of stories on
the plight of pipeline families).
173
See Powerofonepk, Comment to Government Bars American Family from
Contacting
Daughter,
THE
WASH.
TIMES
COMMUNITIES,
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/red-thread-adoptivefamily-forum/2011/jun/21/government-bars-american-family-contactingdaughte/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2012) (commenting, from personal experience,
on the government’s inaction as adoptive child sat in an institution in Nepal).
174
See Experts Respond To ‘The Baby Business,’ THE SCHUSTER INSTITUTE FOR
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, http://www.brandeis.edu/investigate/adoption/
expertsrespond_PEAR.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011) (providing eight
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coverage is for the plight of pipeline families, with the expectation
that if politicians were aware of the pipeline adoption problems,
attempts would be made to resolve it.175
In August 2011, in an attempt to bring national coverage to
the pipeline adoption problem, pipeline families scheduled a march
in Washington, D.C., called the “Step Forward for Orphans
March,” to implore the U.S. government to address the critical
situation affecting orphans worldwide.176 Unfortunately, due to
Hurricane Irene, the march was postponed until December 2011.177
At the march, pipeline families were expected to join leaders in the
international adoption community and children’s aid organizations
with a mission to reform the international adoption system.178
Pipeline parents understand that officials at the U.S. Department of
State have the power to expedite the completion of pipeline

suggestions to alleviate concerns of corruption and to reform international
adoption); see also Lori Lu Green LeRoy, Comment to Step Forward for
Orphans March: American Families to Protest U.S. Policies, THE WASH. TIMES
COMMUNITIES,
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/redthread-adoptive-family-forum/2011/aug/15/separated-their-children-us-policiesamerican-fami/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2012) (expressing hope that children’s aid
organizations can aid in improving the international adoption system).
175
See Comments to Rubio Blocks Obama’s Nominee for Vietnamese
Ambassador, THE WASH. TIMES COMMUNITIES,
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/red-thread-adoptivefamily-forum/2011/may/23/rubio-blocks-obama-nominee-vietnam-ambassador/
(last visited Sept. 26, 2012) (praising Senators Rubio and Lugar for taking
stances in support of pipeline family unification); see also DRNACHAMA,
Comment to Government Bars American Family from Contacting Daughter,
THE
WASH.
TIMES
COMMUNITIES,
June
21,
2011,
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/red-thread-adoptivefamily-forum/2011/jun/21/government-bars-american-family-contactingdaughte/ (demonstrating attempts to gather support for a political petition).
176
See Poe, Step Forward, supra note 97 (declaring that participants for the
event included pipeline parents, children’s aid organizations, and other
supporters).
177
See Craig Juntunen, Hurricane Irene Scraps Plans for the Step Forward for
Orphans
March,
BOTH
ENDS
BURNING
(Aug.
30,
2011),
http://bothendsburning.org/happening/hurricane-irene-scraps-plans-steporphans-march/ (informing readers that the movement’s tentative plan was to reschedule for December 2011).
178
See Step Forward for Orphans March to Tell Story of Children Blocked from
Joining Families, BUS. WIRE (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.businesswire.com/
news/home/20110823005193/en (listing expected participants in the march); see
also Poe, Step Forward, supra note 97 (asserting that a goal of the march was to
bring this issue to the attention of the U.S. Department of State which has the
power to facilitate unification of these pipeline families).
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adoptions,179 and the march was intended to bring the attention of
those officials to an issue that has been ongoing for years.180
2. Steps Taken by the U.S. Government
Despite the outcries from pipeline parents and their
supporters, the U.S. Department of State has done little to remedy
the pipeline adoption problem. In fact, the Department of State has
further obstructed the process of pipeline adoptions by failing to
give constructive advice to pipeline families inquiring about the
completion of their adoptions.181 For example, in late 2010, after
pipeline parents were told to cease all contact with their children in
Vietnam, the Department of State advised them to withdraw their
adoption petitions completely because, as the Department of State
alleged, the U.S. cannot help to facilitate their adoptions.182
Further, officials at the Department of State told pipeline families
they should reapply for adoption in Vietnam after Vietnam ratified
the Hague Convention,183 completely disregarding the fact that
these pipeline parents and children had already formed a familial
bond. Moreover, the Department of State noted that if Vietnam
implemented the Hague Convention, any child whose petition was
withdrawn would be matched with a different family, and pipeline
parents would lose the opportunity to ever unite with their adopted

179

See Hague Convention, supra note 5 (stipulating that Central Authorities can
take necessary actions to oversee quick adoption measures in countries that are
parties to the Convention).
180
See ‘Step Forward for Orphans March’ to Advocate for a Child’s Right to a
Permanent Family, BUCKNER INTERNATIONAL (Aug. 18, 2011),
http://www.buckner.org/enews/index.php/2011/08/step-forward-for-orphansmarch/ (quoting Both Ends Burning founder, Craig Juntunen, who stated that his
goal was to create a social movement that will help spur policy change for
international adoptions); see also Poe, Step Forward, supra note 97 (expressing
that the march’s goal was to gain the Department of State’s attention).
181
See McCarty, supra note 103 (elaborating on the failure of the Department of
State to give assistance to a pipeline family); see also Poe, Government Bars,
supra note 12 (criticizing the Department of State for the lack of assistance it
has been given to the pipeline families).
182
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ADOPTION NOTICE VIETNAM,
http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/country_specific_alerts_notices.p
hp?alert_notice_type=notices&alert_notice_file=vietnam_2 (last visited Oct. 31,
2012) (pronouncing that the U.S. Department of State must evaluate Vietnam’s
adoption program before they are able to facilitate adoptions); see also Poe,
Government Bars, supra note 12 (indicating that a family was told by the U.S.
Department of State to withdraw their petition to adopt a child from Vietnam).
183
See Poe, Government Bars supra note 12; see also Elaine, An Open Letter for
the Bac Lieu 16, LOOKING FOR GEORGE (June 27, 2011),
http://lookingforgeorge.wordpress.com/2011/06/27/an-open-letter-for-the-baclieu-16/ (emphasizing that the pipeline parents of the Bac Lieu orphans were
simply told to reapply after Vietnam ratifies the Hague Convention).
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children.184 The State Department’s recommendations suggest that
these orphaned children were somehow interchangeable, and
pipeline families rightfully refused to follow such ignorant
advice.185
Government officials who tried to shed light on the pipeline
adoption issue have had varying success. In late 2010, Senator
John Kerry and House of Representatives member Stephen Lynch,
along with twenty-three of their Congressional colleagues, sent a
letter to Secretary of State Clinton urging her to resolve the Nepal
pipeline cases quickly.186 That letter explained that pipeline
families are “enduring extreme emotional and financial burdens
while their children’s cases are investigated further.”187 In a press
conference, Senator Kerry stated that one pipeline mother from
Massachusetts is “caught in a snag of international red tape trying
to do what’s right for her family and for an innocent child in need
of medical attention . . . She’s played by the rules and our job is to
help her.”188 Despite the encouraging tone of the letter and speech,
there is little evidence of any progress on the Nepal pipeline
adoptions by Secretary of State Clinton or the Congresspeople who
wrote the letter.189
Unlike the limited progress made by politicians on the
pipeline adoptions in Nepal, many parents who were recently
united with their adopted children from Bac Lieu credit Senators
Mark Rubio and Richard Lugar.190 In May 2011, Senator Mark
Rubio placed a hold on the nomination of David Shear for
184

See Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12 (reporting that the child is likely to
be matched with a new family under the new system of adoptions).
185
Id. (specifying that a family refused to withdraw the petition, as the State
Department told them to do).
186
See Press Release, John Kerry, Urging U.S. State Department to Expedite
Nepalese Adoptions Already in Progress (Sept. 20, 2010) (on file with author).
187
Id.
188
Id. (stating that a child with a cleft pallet was awaiting medical treatment
available in the U.S.); see also Brady-Myerov, supra note 163 (explaining how a
mother refuses to abandon her adopted child, although she may lose her job if
she stays with her child abroad).
189
See Jessica Dealy, Snag in Nepal Adoptions to US Families, NECN.COM,
Sept. 27, 2010, http://www.necn.com/09/27/10/Snag-in-Nepal-adoptions-to-USfamilies/landing_politics.html?&blockID=3&apID=b8ca6247a3fe44c9a117ffbb
95189ae7 (revealing that as of September 27, 2010, the U.S. government did not
process any pipeline cases that its adoption website suggested would be
processed); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Department of
State Continues to Recommend Against Adopting from Nepal (Aug. 14, 2012)
(on file with author) (indicating that the U.S. government has not changed its
position towards Nepalese adoptions).
190
See Ensslin, supra note 118 (recognizing Senator Lugar and others who took
action on behalf of pipeline families by placing a hold on President Obama’s
ambassador nominee); see also Ganote, supra note 134 (indicating a family’s
recognition that their Vietnamese adoption became official because of Senator
Lugar’s help).
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ambassador to Vietnam in an effort to get pipeline families
information about the status of assistance to their cause.191 Senator
Rubio’s action followed a hold placed by Senator Richard Lugar
for similar concerns.192 The senators’ actions were a response to
the obstacles faced by pipeline families when they tried to gain
information about their adoption files from the Departments of
State and Homeland Security.193 One attorney for a pipeline
family was hopeful that the block would “instill a sense of urgency
and help the Department of State focus on resolving these cases
immediately.”194 In addition, one pipeline couple attributed their
unification with their adopted child to Senator Lugar’s hold which
prompted the Department of State to get involved.195
IV.

Political Suggestions to Help Safely Expedite Pipeline
Adoptions

Aside from the action of a few politicians, the U.S.
government has not proposed any potential solutions for the
pipeline problem created by the Hague Convention.
The
Department of State has done little beyond encouraging countries
with pipeline children to ratify and implement the regulations of
the Hague Convention.196 There is no doubt that the Hague

191

See Matthew Pennington, Senate Confirms 1st U.S. Special Envoy to
Myanmar, New Ambassador to Vietnam, CANADIAN PRESS (Aug. 3, 2011, 2:25
PM) (reporting that a group of lawmakers blocked David Shear’s nomination as
Vietnam’s ambassador to challenge adoption delays in Vietnam); see also Poe,
Rubio Blocks, supra note 105 (noting that Senator Rubio placed a hold on
Shear’s nomination to pressure the government to report the status of pending
Vietnamese adoptions).
192
See Lona O’Connor, Local Teacher Takes Adoption Plea to D.C., THE PALM
BEACH POST (May 29, 2011), available at http://www.palmbeachpost.com/
news/local-teacher-takes-adoption-plea-to-dc/nLsn2/
(acknowledging
that
Senator Lugar and Senator Rubio’s holds were effective in bringing government
attention to international adoption issues); see also Poe, Rubio Blocks, supra
note 105.
193
See Lesley Clark, Marco Rubio Puts a Hold on an Obama Nominee, THE
MIAMI HERALD (May 23, 2011), available at http://miamiherald.typepad.com/
nakedpolitics/2011/05/marco-rubio-puts-a-hold-on-an-obama-nominee.html; see
also Poe, Rubio Blocks, supra note 105.
194
See Poe, Rubio Blocks, supra note 105 (quoting attorney Kelly Ensslin’s
belief that the Senators’ holds on Ambassador Shear would propel the
Department of State to take action on the issue).
195
See Poe, Happy Ending, supra note 98 (expressing the LeRoy family’s
appreciation of Senator Lugar’s work bringing attention to the issues of pipeline
families).
196
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE CONTINUES TO
RECOMMEND
AGAINST
ADOPTING
FROM
NEPAL,
http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/country_specific_alerts_notices.p
hp?alert_notice_type=notices&alert_notice_file=nepal_4 (last visited Oct. 31,
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Convention is a significant step toward providing parentless
children homes in an ethical manner.197 However, by prohibiting
pipeline parents from uniting with their adopted children, the U.S.
government has inappropriately placed priority on Hague
Convention regulation over the best interests of the children.198
More must be done to aid pipeline families, in order to
satisfy the best interests standard emphasized by the Hague
Convention. Thus far, the U.S. government has put forth mediocre
efforts to rectify the pipeline adoption problem. Moreover, while
pipeline parents wait for government action, their adopted children
continue to languish in sub-standard orphanages. In light of this
problem, I argue that the U.S. should aid sending countries while
they implement the Hague Convention standards. Furthermore, the
U.S. should establish bilateral agreements with sending countries
to expedite pipeline adoptions safely. Alternatively, the U.S. and
sending countries should allow for humanitarian parole while
pipeline adoption paperwork is finalized.
A. The U.S. Should Provide Aid to Sending Countries
Trying to Implement the Hague Convention
Because the pipeline adoption issue is predominately an
American problem,199 the U.S. should use some of its resources to
help countries implement the Hague Convention regulations in
order to expedite unification of pipeline parents and their adopted
children. Most sending countries are developing countries that
need financial assistance and time to implement the Hague
Convention’s standards.200 Moreover, the U.S. has the resources
and governmental stability to help sending countries develop
effective laws and adoption systems.201 By relieving some of the
2012) (discussing the U.S.’ attempt to encourage Nepal to adopt the Hague
Adoption Convention).
197
McKinney, supra note 1, at 389 (arguing that the Hague Convention is an
accomplishment for international law because of its declaration that “children
succeed when raised by stable families”); see also Lynn D. Wardle,
Parentlessness: Adoption Problems, Paradigms, Policies, and Parameters, 4
WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 323, 358 (2005) (recognizing that the Hague
Convention’s importance in international law is that it formally acknowledges
that children do better when brought up in a permanent family environment).
198
See McKinney, supra note 1, at 389 (stating that the Hague Convention’s
initial goal of protecting the timely placement of orphaned children with
adoptive families has shifted toward regulation and restriction of international
adoptions); see also Bartley, supra note 110 (noting that when the U.S. stops
visas it favors regulation over the “heartache and frustration” of pipeline
families).
199
See UNICEF, supra note 3.
200
See McKinney, supra note 1, at 394–95.
201
See Troy, supra note 16, at 1546 (stating that the United States would fulfill
their commitment of making international adoption safer by helping non-
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financial burden required to implement the Hague Convention,
sending countries could more quickly and efficiently resolve
pipeline adoptions. Thus, U.S. assistance would expedite pipeline
adoptions and make it possible for new adoptions as well.
Furthermore, help from the U.S. would ensure that pipeline
adoptions and future adoptions are made using ethical adoption
practices in accordance with the Hague Convention.
Although some may argue that U.S. assistance with Hague
Convention implementation would be paternalistic, this is not the
case because developing countries have attempted to comply with
Hague Convention’s standards on their own but have simply
lacked the resources to do so. With U.S. help, developing
countries that wish to comply with the Hague Convention would
be given the resources to implement the treaty. Moreover, aid
would only be necessary during the transitional period from
signing to ratifying the convention.202 The Hague Convention
states that signatory countries should collaborate through their
Central Authorities to establish a system of adoption that complies
with Hague Convention standards.203 Thus, aid from the U.S.
would not be an improper imposition on developing countries.
Rather, it would help other signatories develop adoption practices
that would facilitate the completion of pipeline adoptions, and
establish a foundation for developing countries to implement
Hague Convention standards.
The U.S. should help sending countries’ complete pipeline
adoptions by analyzing them on a case-by-case basis, to ensure that
no unethical practices have occurred. Such assistance places an
emphasis on the best interests of the children by expediting
unification with their adoptive families and providing one last
safeguard against unethical adoption practices. Although doing a
case-by-case analysis will inevitably take more time than simply
implementing a blanket law delivering pipeline children to their
parents in the U.S., it will be faster than waiting for sending
countries to comply with the Hague Convention on their own.
Although the U.S. should assist sending countries with
applying the Hague Convention and completing pipeline
adoptions, the U.S. should have limited enforcement capability.
Some scholars argue that a body of oversight and enforcement

member sending countries to become members of the Convention); see also
Worthington, supra note 11, at 585 (indicating that the United States has the
adequate tools and experience to facilitate a poorer country’s implementation of
effective adoption systems).
202
See Wittner, supra note 9, at 617–18 (noting that developing countries
struggle to ratify the treaty).
203
See Hague Convention, supra note 5.
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should be put in place to effectuate lawful adoption procedures.204
However, that type of overbearing regulation may lead to needless
tension between the U.S. and sending countries, creating the
potential for moratoriums on international adoptions. Moreover,
sending countries may be unwilling to accept assistance from the
U.S. if they fear the U.S. will impose penalties or punishments for
failing to comply with Hague Convention standards. Thus, the
U.S. should help sending countries to expedite pipeline adoptions
and develop ethical adoption practices, but should not act as a
policing mechanism.
B. The U.S. Should Enter Bilateral Agreements with
Sending Countries to Expedite Pipeline Adoptions
By using bilateral agreements, both the U.S. and sending
countries could agree to standards that would ensure ethical
adoption practices and safely unite pipeline children with their
adoptive parents without interfering with implementation of the
Hague Convention. Bilateral agreements would expedite pipeline
adoptions because pipeline parents would not have to wait until the
sending countries have fully complied with the Hague Convention.
While some may argue that bilateral agreements would allow
sending countries to bypass the Hague Convention’s standards,205
the U.S., as a member of the Hague Convention, would ensure that
the bilateral agreements contain ethical adoption practices.206
Thus, bilateral agreements have the potential to expedite pipeline
adoptions in sending countries that are struggling with
implementing the Hague Convention in its entirety.

204

See Daly, supra note 83, at 628 (arguing that an oversight body should be
imposed in Guatemala that would comprise of “U.S. State Department officials,
representatives from accredited American adoption agencies who operate in
Guatemala, and Guatemalan professionals who currently engage in lawful
adoption procedures”); see also Ratcliff, supra note 29, at 353–54 (asserting
that a UN appointed oversight body be created to ensure that the Convention is
applied correctly and to enforce penalties on countries that have sub-standard
adoption policies).
205
See Kimball, supra note 9, at 564 (remarking that intercountry adoptions with
non-member countries will persist, regardless of whether they ratify and
implement the Hague Convention); see also Carlberg, supra note 2, at 152
(suggesting that the bilateral treaty between the U.S. and Vietnam may permit
Vietnam to side-step implementation of the Hague Convention while still
allowing adoptions to the U.S.).
206
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., The Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation Regarding Cooperation in Adoption of Children (July 13,
2011) (on file with author) (explaining that the goal of the bilateral adoption
agreement between the U.S. and the Russian Federation was to ensure ethical
adoption practices).
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In 2005, the U.S. and Vietnam signed a bilateral agreement
to implement ethical adoption practices and facilitate adoptions
between the two countries without requiring Hague Convention
standards.207 The bilateral agreement expired on September 1,
2008 and there is no expectation to renew it.208 The expiration of
this bilateral agreement is not indicative of the fate of future
bilateral agreements on international adoption because the prior
agreement lacked the specificity necessary for it to be effective.
The language in the agreement was almost identical to that of the
Hague Convention, and therefore posed many of the same
problems.209 Unlike the 2005 treaty between the U.S. and
Vietnam, the bilateral agreements that I suggest would only relate
to pipeline adoptions, and would require review of those adoptions
on a case-by-case basis. By making the treaties specific, there
would be greater understanding of their requirements and greater
potential for their success.
While the goal of these bilateral agreements is to unite
pipeline children with their families, they must also ensure children
are not subject to unethical adoption practices. However, because
many pipeline parents have already met the heightened
requirements of the Hague Convention, the bilateral agreements
should permit fulfillment of those requirements to satisfy the check
against unethical practices. For example, in many pipeline cases,
DNA tests have been done to confirm the identity of the children’s
birth mothers.210
In addition, many pipeline parents have
paperwork demonstrating that the birth mother of their adopted
child relinquished her parental rights to that child.211 Under these
bilateral agreements, such documentation should act as proof of
ethical adoption practices. For cases involving pipeline parents
who cannot produce such documentation, bilateral agreements
should impose regulations to ensure that the pipeline child was not
a victim of unethical adoption practices. Thus, these bilateral
207

See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam Regarding Cooperation on the Adoption of Children, U.S.Viet, June 21, 2005, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/2005/87188.htm
(setting forth a section specifically addressing ethical practices).
208
See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: ADOPTIONS FROM VIETNAM TO THE UNITED
STATES WILL NOT RESUME WITHOUT A NEW BILATERAL AGREEMENT (Oct. 16,
2008), http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/VietnamFAQ_16oct08.pdf (stating that
the bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Vietnam has expired); see also Ben
Stocking, U.S.-Vietnam Adoption Pact Ends, Hundreds in Limbo, USA TODAY
(Sept.
1,
2008),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-09-013166225393_x.htm (stating that at the time the agreement expired, the adoption
program was said to be “suspended indefinitely”).
209
See Carlberg, supra note 2, at 150.
210
See Poe, Rubio Blocks, supra note 105.
211
See id.
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agreements would both expedite pipeline adoptions and protect
against unethical adoption practices.
C. Alternatively, the U.S. and Sending Countries Should
Use Humanitarian Parole while Pipeline Adoption
Paperwork is Finalized
If the U.S. and sending countries cannot agree to terms for
bilateral agreements to expedite pipeline adoptions, humanitarian
parole212 should be used. Humanitarian parole would allow
pipeline children to unite with their adoptive families in the U.S.
for a specified period of time while their adoption paperwork is
finalized.213 If during that specified period of time, there was a
finding of unethical adoption practices with respect to a child, that
child would be sent back to the sending country.214 However,
because so many pipeline families have already met requirements
to prove their adoptions are legitimate,215 the possibility that
children would be sent back to their countries of origin would be
slight. Thus, humanitarian parole would allow pipeline parents
and children to unite sooner with a low risk of being separated.
The success of humanitarian parole in pipeline adoption
cases was demonstrated by its application in 2001 by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) after a moratorium
was placed on adoptions from Cambodia to the U.S.216 In that
instance, twelve families were united with their children for two

212

See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
HUMANITARIAN PAROLE, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/
menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=accc3e4d77d7321
0VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=accc3e4d77d73210VgnVC
M100000082ca60aRCRD (defining humanitarian parole as a device “to bring
someone who is otherwise inadmissible into the United States for a temporary
period of time due to a compelling emergency,” and listing the requirements for
receiving humanitarian parole).
213
See, e.g., Wittner, supra note 9, at,596 (noting that Cambodian children who
were granted humanitarian parole were allowed to join new families in the
United States).
214
See INS Reverses Stance for Cambodian Orphans, 20/20 (Jan. 18, 2002),
available at http://abcnews.go.com/2020/story?id=123957&page=
1#.TtFr4WNC9Rs.
215
See, e.g., Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12 (noting that one adoptive
family spent years receiving adoption approval).
216
See Wittner, supra note 9, at 596 (acknowledging that the ban on adoptions
from Cambodia did not affect twelve families who were granted humanitarian
parole for their adopted children); see also INS Reverses Stance for Cambodian
Orphans, 20/20 (Jan. 18, 2002), available at http://abcnews.go.com/2020/
story?id=123957&page=1#.TtFr4WNC9Rs (discussing the INS decision to
grant humanitarian parole for twelve families).
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years while their adoption paperwork was finalized.217 While
those families were grateful to have their adopted children home in
the U.S., they remained anxious over the unlikely possibility that
the birth mothers who abandoned their children would come
forward, requiring the pipeline parents to send their children back
to Cambodia.218 Because of that stress and the possibility that a
child may have to return to his or her country of origin,
humanitarian parole is not preferred over establishing bilateral
agreements. However, it is preferable to leaving pipeline children
in orphanages where their basic needs are not met. Thus, countries
that are unable to adopt a bilateral agreement should implement
humanitarian parole in order to expedite the unification of pipeline
parents and children.
CONCLUSION
While the mission of the Hague Convention is morally
admirable, its policy to protect the best interests of children in
international adoption has been thwarted by poor implementation.
Because many developing countries are incapable of implementing
the treaty’s heightened requirements, the treaty remains largely
ineffective.
In addition, the moratoriums on international
adoptions that resulted from poor implementation of the Hague
Convention have created serious problems for adoptions that were
in the pipeline when the bans were put in place. While the Hague
Convention was designed to provide a framework for safer
international adoptions, in practice, it has slowed adoptions and
caused hundreds of orphaned children to suffer in sub-standard
orphanages without knowing when or if their adoptive parents will
come for them. In an effort to rectify this problem, the U.S.
government should provide aid for sending countries that are
trying to implement the Hague Convention. Moreover, the U.S.
should establish bilateral agreements with sending countries, or use
humanitarian parole. These proposed solutions would expedite the
unification of pipeline parents and children, and protect against
corrupt adoption practices, thereby providing for the best interests
of the pipeline children where the Hague Convention has not.

217

See Wittner, supra note 9, at 596; see also INS Reverses Stance for
Cambodian Orphans, supra note 217.
218
See INS Reverses Stance for Cambodian Orphans, supra note 217.

